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One always begins by ‘drawing a distinction’, Niklas Luhmann was fond of reminding 
us, and Arendt begins On Revolution by drawing a distinction that throughout the treatise 
remains stark, pivotal, resistant, insubordinate to mediation, synthesis and sublation. It is 
the distinction between the social and the political. It lies at the basis of the constitutional 
question, and as foundational informs not just the remit of the constitutional but its very 
possibility: because it does not allow us to step behind it, the foundation that is, and to put 
it to question politically.  
The departure is significant and the endurance of the distinction remarkable. We 
find the quasi-normative function that the distinction performs replicated later and in 
different forms, but invariably working at the deep level of context-setting. It is, for 
example, famously articulated in Agamben’s ‘bio-political fracture’. Agamben’s bios/zoe 
distinction mirrors Arendt’s, in his insistent return to the ‘zone of indistinction’ between 
the two terms that mirrors her resistance to any kind of dialectical overcoming of the 
social and the political. And for him, all too impatiently, it is the endurance of the 
distinction that explains the travesty of ‘political’ projects launched to tackle need 
abroad: ‘[T]oday’s democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through 
development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but also 
transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life.’1  
What makes the distinction between the political and the social so fundamental 
and, we shall argue, fundamentally problematic? Let us take this gradually. 
 
I. Unburdening the Constitution 
 
The second chapter of Arendt’s famous book is dedicated to the ‘social question’, or what 
‘we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty’.2 When Robespierre 
declared that everything which is necessary to maintain life must be common good and 
only the surplus can be recognised as private property, for Arendt ‘he was, in his own 
words, “subjecting revolutionary government to the most sacred of laws, the welfare of 
the people, the most irrefragable of all titles, necessity.”’3 For her it was necessity, the 
urgent needs of the people, that unleashed the terror and sent the Revolution to its doom. 
She cites Jefferson approvingly, when he declared that a people ‘so loaded with misery 
would [not] be able to achieve what had been achieved in America’. And about John 
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Adams’s ‘conviction’ that a free republican government ‘was as unnatural … as it would 
be over elephants, lions, wolves [etc] in the royal menagerie at Versailles’, she proclaims, 
rather disturbingly, that ‘years later, events to an extent proved him right’.4  
Why do the cries of the dispossessed masses not resonate politically? What is it 
about their movement that ‘sent the revolution to its doom’? The ‘transformation of the 
Rights of Man into the Rights of the Sans-Culottes’, Arendt argues, abandons the 
foundation of freedom to the ‘powerful conspiracy of necessity and poverty’, 
Robespierre’s relentless insistence on the latter forcing him to miss the ‘historical 
moment’ to ‘found freedom’.5 Arendt’s unreserved admiration for the American 
Revolution is nowhere thrown into starker contrast with her misgivings about the French 
Revolution than in these pages on the ‘social question’, and this in the context of the 
acutest of analyses of Robespierre’s claim to speak on behalf of the dispossessed. The 
guiding distinction operates here to set up freedom against necessity as involving 
contrasting logics, a contrast that Arendt is keen to map on to the distinction between the 
social, as sphere of necessity, and the political, as sphere of freedom.  
Marx is the obvious counter-point, and Arendt takes the challenge head on. ‘It 
took more than half a century before the transformation of the Rights of Man into the 
Rights of the Sans-Culottes, the abdication of freedom before the dictate of necessity, had 
found its theorist’ in Marx.6 What a strange formulation this is, couched in a vocabulary 
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of abdication, and thus of a certain refusal of a different route. What, one might pause to 
ask, does ‘abdication of freedom’ mean for the sans-culottes? What possibility of 
freedom did the Parisian mob really forgo in bringing the ‘needs of the body’ into the 
streets? What makes this simple question so difficult for Arendt to ask? Nothing but her 
unwavering reassertion of the founding disjuncture. Notwithstanding the lip service to his 
greatness (‘the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had’), a kind of knee-jerk anti-
Marxism dominates her thinking here, most tellingly in the extraordinary reversal that she 
attributes to Marx in the ‘social question’. 
Marx’s genius and ultimately his theoretical error, for Arendt, is that he read the 
social question in political terms. That means that he read the question of poverty as a 
question of the suppression of freedom, and the way he achieved this was through the 
theory of exploitation. This allows the connection between the two spheres to be 
‘mediated’: 
Marx’s transformation of the social question into a political force is contained in the term 
‘exploiation’, that is in the notion that poverty is the result of exploitation through a 
‘ruling class’ which is in the possession of the means of violence...His most explosive 
and indeed most original contribution … was that he interpreted the compelling needs of 
mass poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for the sake of bread or wealth, but for 
the sake of freedom as well.7  
 
Thus, asserts Arendt, in order to conjure up a ‘spirit of rebelliousness that can spring only 
from being violated, not from being under the sway of necessity’ Marx helped to 
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persuade the poor ‘that poverty itself is a political not a natural phenomenon, the result of 
violence and violation rather than scarcity’.8 
  Arendt sets out to prove Marx wrong to interpret the ‘predicament of poverty in 
categories of oppression and exploitation’, by returning to the embeddedness of her 
founding distinction, the foundational character of the disconnect.9 This involves a 
striking reversal that puts the burden on her interlocutor to defend the attempted 
‘synthesis’ through exploitation. Her argument involves as ever the restatement of the 
obviousness of her premises and the foundational nature of the organising disjuncture.  
The recovery of the ability to act cannot spring from necessity since the logic of 
‘emancipation’ is too rooted in the release of a natural propensity. Becoming-political is 
thus a problem for Arendt in the absence of the preconditions of such action in freedom. 
It is this absence that drives Marx to attach himself to the Hegelian dialectic in which 
‘freedom would directly rise out of necessity’, a dialectic and a coincidence that Arendt 
has earlier characterised as ‘perhaps the most terrible and, humanly speaking, least 
bearable paradox in the body of modern thought’.10 But for Arendt the two spheres are 
not and cannot be tied dialectically – necessity never gets a foothold in a dialectic of 
action. 
Having repeated her premises, Arendt’s rebuttal of Marx becomes fairly cursory. 
Her first criticism is that he abandons ‘the revolutionary élan of his youth’ to redefine it 
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in economic terms, which means also the ‘iron laws of historical necessity’11; ‘necessity’ 
again serving to fold the revolutionary moment back into the binarism from which it 
seemingly never can depart. Her second criticism is that he ‘strengthened more than 
anybody else the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life 
is the highest good and that the life process of society is the very centre of human 
endeavour.’12 With this new emphasis,  
the role of revolution is no longer to liberate men from the oppression of their fellow men, 
let alone to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society itself from the fetters 
of scarcity so that it would swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance 
became the new aim of revolution.13  
 
A displacement thus of the very aspiration of political action, a falling short that turns out 
to be a radical undercutting of the logic of political action. 
If this appears a rather odd rendering of Marx, or at least a rather facile turning of 
the later Marx against his earlier, better self, it is because it is that, both odd and facile, 
based on an impatient misreading that identifies in Marx the ‘ambition to raise his science 
to the rank of a natural science’ at the expense of the political, ‘a surrender of freedom to 
necessity’.14 ‘The trouble,’ Arendt will tell us, ‘is of a theoretical nature’.15 Marx’s 
economic explanations simply merge violence and necessity together back into the sphere 
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that, properly understood, is on the other side of the political, the concept itself of a 
‘political economy’ an impossible merger of two domains.  
Antonio Negri, who in Insurgencies initially reserves some praise for Arendt’s 
‘very rich and fierce phenomenological exercise’, is left ‘ill at ease’ at this point by her 
‘definition of constituent power’.16 ‘The constitutive phenomenology of the principle 
reveals itself as perfectly conservative’ and she thus ‘bears the responsibility of the 
contempt towards the multitude that does not want to be the people, of a constituent 
power that does not want to be the bourgeoisie’.17 
We shall return to Negri’s careful rebuttal of Arendt’s take on constituent power 
later. For now we join him in feeling somewhat ‘ill at ease’ with what in fact confronts us 
here: an astounding ‘partage of the sensible’, a carving up and separating-off of the 
question of human welfare from politics, and the redress of misery from what is properly 
the political aspiration of freedom. To claim that the masses that storm revolutionary 
Paris in 1789, and then in 1848 and in July 1871, raise the ‘social’ rather than the 
political question, is to sever the question of distribution from the political means of 
redressing asymmetries in access to the means of production and the distribution of its 
products. In Arendt, this severing underwrites nothing less than the understanding itself 
of the political and the possibility itself of freedom.  
We have seen how the social/political distinction is mapped onto that between 
necessity and freedom, and Marxism rejected as suggesting an unsustainable bridging of 
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both sets through the notion of exploitation, a move that in Arendt becomes something 
akin to a categorical mistake. This constitutive severing is buttressed through a second 
one, and the distinction between compassion and solidarity deployed to qualify further 
the political proper. With Marx, she has expelled ‘exploitation’ from the political; with 
Rousseau she is now poised to expel ‘compassion’. 
One of the many striking features of the analysis of the ‘social question’ in On 
Revolution is that it relegates Rousseau to a theorist of ‘compassion’ in the first place, in 
taking as fundamental Rousseau’s near-axiomatic ‘innate repugnance at seeing a fellow 
human suffer’.18 Rousseau found compassion to be the most natural human reaction to 
the suffering of others, and therefore the very foundation of all authentic ‘natural’ human 
intercourse’19:  
It was this capacity for suffering that Rousseau had pitted against the selfishness of 
society on the one hand, against the undisturbed solitude of the mind, on the other. And it 
was to this emphasis on suffering, more than to any other part of his teachings, that he 
owed the enormous, predominant influence over the minds of the men who were to make 
the Revolution, and who found themselves confronted with the overwhelming sufferings 
of the poor to whom they had opened the doors to the public realm and its light for the 
first time in history.20  
 
What Rousseau had introduced to political thought, Robespierre carried over into 
revolutionary practice.  
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To see what Arendt sees wrong in compassion we must take a step back, to return 
to the idea of representation and what it means to speak ‘on behalf of’:  
The men of the [French] Revolution and the people whom they represented were no 
longer united by objective bonds in a common cause; a special effort was required of the 
representatives, an effort of solidarization [emphasis added] which Robespierre called 
virtue, and this virtue … did not aim at the res publica and had nothing to do with 
freedom. Virtue meant to have the welfare of the people in mind, to identify one’s own 
will with the will of the people – and this effort was directed primarily toward the 
happiness of the many.21  
 
The very definition of the term ‘le peuple’ that designates those who were spoken for and 
on behalf of, is ‘born out of compassion’,22 and the ‘term became equivalent for 
misfortune (‘le people, les malheureux m’appaudissent’ Robespierre would claim). In the 
absence of political mediation as such, the legitimacy of the representatives of the people 
could reside only in the ‘compassionate zeal’ of those who were prepared to raise it to 
‘the rank of the supreme political passion and highest political virtue’.23 They came to 
express the ‘will’ of the people, and the cue they took from Rousseau was that the general 
will was what bound the many into one, and thus had to be one (‘Il faut une volonte 
UNE’, Robespierre insisted) or not at all. This ‘speaking on behalf of’ came to supplant 
‘all processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual agreement between them’.24 
Arendt insists on an important point here: that in the zeal and impetus of this supplanting, 
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the will is uprooted from the worldly institutions which alone underwrote what they had 
in common, and thus cancelled it out. 
It is on these grounds that Arendt will condemn the colonisation of public space 
by the ideals of compassion and virtue, and a misconception of solidarity that stems from 
the latter to inform the former (solidarity will be restored later to its proper political-
institutional understanding): ‘Robespierre’s “terror of virtue” cannot be understood 
without taking into account the crucial role compassion had come to play in the minds 
and hearts of those who acted in the course of the French Revolution.’25  Compassion, 
with its gaze on concreteness and particularity, is both inappropriate institutionally and 
destructive when it informs the acts of the ‘virtuous’, because it collapses the space in-
between that commonality demands as constitutive of what it means to share a world: 
Because compassion abolishes the distance, the worldly space between men where 
political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located, it remains, politically 
speaking, irrelevant and without consequence…As a rule it is not compassion which sets 
out to change worldly conditions in order to ease human suffering, but if it does, it will 
shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of persuasion, negotiation and compromise, 
which are the processes of law and politics, and lend its voice to the suffering itself, 
which must claim for swift and direct action, that is, for action with the means of 
violence.26 
 
By the time we reach section 4 of Arendt’s chapter, ‘compassion’ has given way to ‘pity’, 
and its objects, ‘les malheureux’, have respectively given way to ‘les faibles’ in order for 
the ‘alternative’ to be designated as ‘solidarity’27:  
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 ‘Solidarity’ allows men to establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a 
community of interest with the oppressed and the exploited. The common interest would 
then be the ‘grandeur of man’, or the ‘honour of the human race’, or the dignity of man. 
For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is able to 
comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation, or a 
people, but eventually all mankind. But this solidarity, though it may be aroused by 
suffering, is not guided by it, and it comprehends the strong and the rich no less than the 
weak and the poor; compared with the sentiment of pity, it may appear cold and abstract, 
for it remains committed to ideas – to greatness or honour, or dignity – rather than to any 
‘love’ of men.28  
 
Notwithstanding the perhaps underhand dig at Robespierre – that ‘pity’ has a ‘vested 
interest in the existence of the unhappy’29 – it has also ‘proved to possess a greater 
capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself’. ‘Proved’ is an odd word here in the midst of a 
conceptual analysis, but it does reveal something interesting about a certain bias that 
returns and returns again to colour the mapping of distinctions. But there is something 
even more disquieting about the direction that Arendt’s analysis now takes. She aims it, 
again, at the Jacobins: since the Revolution had opened the gates of the political realm to 
the poor, this realm had indeed become ‘social’. It was overwhelmed by the cares and 
worries which actually belonged in the sphere of the household and which, even if they 
were permitted to enter the public realm, could not be solved by political means, since 
they were matters of administration, to be put into the hands of experts, rather than issues 
which could be settled by the twofold process of decision and persuasion.’30 And further: 
‘Their [the revolutionaries’] need was violent, and as it were, pre-political; it seemed that 
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only violence could be strong and swift enough to help them.’ This dire section of the 
chapter on the ‘social question’ finds its disturbing culmination in the concluding 
paragraph where Arendt asserts: ‘Nothing we might say today, could be more obsolete 
than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means; nothing could be 
more futile and more dangerous.’31 
What began as an extraordinary analysis of the phenomenology of the 
revolutionary event, of the constituent and of the novelty of the concept of beginning, 
thus winds up as bourgeois alarmism. And Negri is surely right to express his unease 
about a move that ‘at the very moment when she illuminates the nature of constituent 
power Arendt renders it indifferent in its ideality or equivocal in its historical 
exemplification.’32 His critique is twofold: her account of the formation of political space 
‘becomes the key to a historicist hermeneutics that systematically flattens down, or 
deforms, the novelty of the event and limits it to the American example’; and the 
‘ambiguity of the beginning … [is] resolved in formal terms, according to the demands of 
an idealism content to find a correspondence in institutions’.33 
Both points are well taken and developed in Insurgencies. But there is also 
something else important to observe about the trajectory, that has nothing to do with 
Arendt’s political sympathies or failings, or her admiration for the constitutional 
arrangement of the US, but more with a process where the drawing of distinctions has 
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selectively opened up and simultaneously foreclosed a space for the appearance of the 
political. What is at stake is the withdrawal of that space of appearance, as in the case 
where the social demands of recognition and distribution are denied a political register. 
The denial is then effaced, doubly forgotten or rendered ‘immemorial’ in Lyotard’s 
precise meaning, when the very purity of the constitutional question demands that its 
statement in political terms proper – as condition of freedom – is its unburdening from 
the social question.  
 
II. Domesticating the Agon 
 
Arendt’s fundamental distinction between the social and the political thus effectively 
domesticates the agonism that she valorises, evacuating any transformative potential that 
it might otherwise promise. Arendt offers a powerful image of constituent power as 
pertaining not only to the act of constituting the laws of government but to the 
constitution of the common, the disclosure of a common world.34 For her, a revolution is 
properly political to the extent that it aims at constituting and preserving a space of 
appearances within which citizens can continue to engage in a striving for distinction and 
recognition. From the agonistic interplay of a plurality of perspectives brought to bear 
within the public sphere, the commonness of the world that lies between citizens is 
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constantly disclosed and reconstituted. While liberation from domination by men and the 
necessities of nature is a condition of possibility for the establishment of such a space of 
appearances, this space, she insists, emerges only through the enactment and enjoyment 
of freedom as an end in itself. 
In contrast to her characterisation of the necessity, hierarchy, obscurity and 
conformity of the social, her conception of the political in terms of spontaneity, equality, 
publicity and plurality presents an inspiring image of constituent power. Indeed, Negri 
admires Arendt for having ‘given us the clearest image of constituent power in its 
radicalness and strength’.35 Constituent power inheres in the exhilarating experience of 
initiatory action, but ultimately also in the production of the common. For Arendt, as 
Negri puts it, freedom ‘becomes public space, constituting a communicative relation, its 
own conditions of possibility and therefore its own strength. It is the polis. Freedom is a 
beginning that poses its own conditions’.36  
Scholars of Arendt have been tempted to bracket the reactionary or ‘elitist’ 
element of her thought that is encapsulated in her conception of the social, in order to 
appropriate the ‘democratic’ strain, which celebrates the creative, world-disclosing 
essence of the political.37 But such a selective reading of Arendt is limited because her 
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political ontology in underpinned by a dichotomy between necessity and freedom. One 
cannot bracket here without undoing, or at least leaving the political fundamentally 
under-determined. Indeed, for Arendt, the achievement of action is precisely the 
transcendence of necessity: the causal relations to which the natural world is subject. It is 
through this transcendence that actors distinguish themselves as human. Conversely, 
subjection to necessity is inherently dehumanising. To be subject to necessity is to be 
deprived of the possibility of meaningful action and the existential achievement of self-
disclosure. Hence her unflattering descriptions of “savages”, stateless people, the poor 
and other marginalised groups. 
For Arendt, human beings are capable of action by virtue of being born. She takes 
birth, here, not as a biological fact that humans share with animals but as a social fact, 
since only human beings appear at birth in a world that is constituted through work and 
action. This world is a condition of possibility for the event of birth because the human 
artifice produced through work provides a measure of durability and permanence against 
the cyclical futility of nature. Moreover, the web of relationships that are constituted 
through action provides a social context in which the event can be witnessed, 
commemorated and invested with meaning.  
Correlatively, the established constitution of a political community is part both of 
the artifice of things (as nomos, its wall-like aspect enclosing the common) and of the 
web of relationships (as lex, its relational aspect constituting individuals as persons 
through mutual recognition). The purpose of the constitution is to enable the continuity of 
the community through time by providing a measure of permanence to human affairs, to 
house the space of appearances, making possible an organised remembrance. Moreover, 
it provides a measure of predictability through establishing shared expectations, that 
enables the polity to act into the future. The purpose of a constitution should be to 
commemorate the inaugural event through which the community is constituted, so that 
the principle of freedom it revealed can inspire and animate the public sphere of the 
constituted community. Through speaking and acting together within this public sphere 
citizens would thus enact their freedom anew, augmenting the authority of the 
constitution that was anticipated in its founding moment. 
Arendt’s thought has the merit of returning our attention to the fundamental 
dimension of politics as always ultimately concerned with the constitution of the 
common. However, it is difficult to extract from her work a conception of transformative 
politics precisely because her conception of action is ‘ontologically rooted’ in the ‘fact of 
natality’.38 For her, the world-disclosive possibility of action is tied to the desire for self-
disclosure, which she takes to be part of the human condition. The struggle for 
recognition to which this gives rise and the common that it discloses emerges against the 
dark background of the sheer givenness of human existence in a state of nature. What this 
ontological grounding of agonism elides, however, is how the common itself, its stakes 
and its shares, can become the object of political contest. 
To be sure, in the Arendtian public sphere, individuals contest the way the world 
appears to them through the exchange of opinions. But politicisation typically entails a 
struggle to represent a rival image of the common, which denaturalises our common 
sense of the world. Arendt’s interest in the initiatory quality of praxis, however, does not 
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arise from a concern to conceptualise acts of politicisation. Rather, her concern is with 
resisting the rise of mass society, which made possible totalitarianism. In particular, 
Arendt deplores the emergence of what Foucault would call biopolitics (‘the rise of the 
social’) in which the life process of society (or the population) becomes the primary 
concern of politics. Arendt blames the modern elevation of life to the highest of goods for 
the spread of world-alienation, loneliness, and the futility and meaningless of modern 
life, which created a vacuum within which totalitarianism could emerge. 
In modernity, the scope for human freedom has been diminished because the 
activity of labour and its concern with satisfying the needs of the body –‘making life 
easier and longer’– have come to dominate the public realm.39 While Arendt 
distinguishes the political sharply from the social, then, this is not a simple opposition. 
Whereas, for Arendt, our political interest in actualising freedom is a properly public 
concern, our economic interest in sustaining life is a properly private concern. The social, 
in contrast, is a hybrid realm that comes about by the improper pursuit of economic 
concerns in public life. Society is the ‘public organization of the life process itself … the 
form [of living together] in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and 
nothing else assumes public significance’.40 The cost of elevating life as the ultimate end 
of political organisation is that human affairs are deprived of the reality and significance 
that comes from the world-disclosing activity of praxis. 
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Arendt turns to the Greek polis to recuperate a conception of the political that 
might redeem the contemporary world from this malaise. She looks to the experience of 
the Greek polis not out of nostalgia but, she claims, because ‘a freedom experienced in 
the process of acting and nothing else – though, of course, mankind never lost this 
experience altogether – has never again been articulated with the same classical clarity.’41 
And it is in this context that she appropriates the Aristotelian distinction between zoe and 
bios: ‘between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance 
of life, a division which all ancient political thought rested as self-evident and 
axiomatic’.42 According to Aristotle, she observes, the good life  
was “good” to the extent that having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed 
from labour and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their 
own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process.43  
 
The political ontology that she outlines in The Human Condition (with its threefold 
distinction between labour, work and action) thus accounts for the intransigence of the 
distinction between the social and the political that pervades her conceptual and historical 
analyses in On Revolution. Whereas the activity of labour corresponds to the human 
condition of life itself, the activity of praxis corresponds to the condition of plurality. 
Labour is inherently unpolitical and potentially anti-political for Arendt, since it is ‘an 
activity in which man is neither together with the world nor with other people, but alone 
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with his body, facing the naked necessity to keep himself alive’.44 While labour may be 
organised and undertaken as a collective enterprise, it does not reveal anything of the 
world that lies between those engaged together in sustaining life. It ‘has none of the 
distinctive marks of true plurality’, since in labouring together human beings do not act 
as unique individuals but as ‘mere living organisms’ that are ‘fundamentally all alike’.45 
Arendt’s brief but approving references to the agonism of the Greeks are made in 
this context. She contrasts the ancient concern to distinguish oneself in public before 
one’s peers with the conformist behaviour of modern society and its equality based on 
sameness. In Athens, she writes, the public realm ‘was permeated by a fiercely agonal 
spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show 
through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best’.46 The public realm ‘was the 
only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were’.47 Arendt 
turns to the experience of the polis to articulate a conception of the political as a space of 
appearances, ‘the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking’, an 
emergent space which ‘can find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere’.48 
Now it is of course true that scholars inspired by Arendt’s agonistic conception of 
politics do acknowledge that her strict separation of the social and the political is 
untenable since it precludes matters of social justice from public debate and privatises 
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social suffering. But what is untenable on the one hand must simultaneously be 
presupposed on the other. For the separation of the social and the political underlies 
Arendtian agonism in order to explain how socially determined identities can be 
transcended through political action in which new subject positions are enacted. Yet, as 
Jean-Philippe Deranty and Emmanuel Renault argue convincingly,49 this account of the 
transcendence of oppressive identities is inadequate because it fails to account for how 
social experience can be constitutive for political action. Indeed, what is required is an 
account of the modes of politicisation through which the social comes to be viewed as 
political, how the suffering that Arendt associates with necessity is revealed as socially 
produced.50 But, as we have already seen, it is precisely in response to such an 
understanding of exploitation that Arendt formulates her distinction between the social 
and the political. 
Might it then be possible, nevertheless and despite Arendt’s own intentions, to 
recast her spatial conception of the political (with its sharp distinction between the 
separate ‘realms’ of necessity and freedom) as a process of politicisation (that enables a 
mediation between necessity and freedom)? This is the suggestion argued by James 
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Clarke,51 who suggests that a revised Arendtian approach enables us to understand how 
human needs might be ‘politicized’ insofar as they can become the object of 
interpretation and discussion. If we acknowledge that the social is the terrain both of state 
intervention and wider political contestation, we can understand the relation between the 
social and the political in terms of the logics of depoliticisation and repoliticisation. On 
the one hand, the social can thus be understood as the realm of sedimented political 
practices in which needs become naturalised. When these needs are asserted in the public 
sphere as given, obdurate and incontestable, this can lead to an anti-political politics. On 
the other hand, when the interpretation of the origin, nature and appropriate form of 
satisfaction of needs and their satisfaction is treated as an object of public debate, needs 
might be politicised. 
On this account, relations of domination that have been naturalised through the 
private/public distinction are not immediately political. Rather, they become political 
when meditated through public action, when a ‘we’ emerges that recognises social 
relations as contingent and therefore potentially transformable. Although the effects of 
oppression are always personally experienced, oppression ‘only becomes political when 
others recognize it as a shared reality and, further, when it can become the basis for 
solidarity and action’.52 In other words, demands for the satisfaction of needs become 
political only when they carry with them the world-disclosing potential that for Arendt is 
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the defining feature of action. On this account it is possible to imagine an agonistic 
politics of need that would involve the politicisation of social suffering.53  
And yet even this careful Arendtian account of becoming-political stumbles on 
Arendt’s very starting points. An Arendtian conception of the political is inadequate for 
thematising acts of politicisation because it only allows for the emergence of a ‘we’ in a 
situation where political actors are neither for nor against but only ‘with’ others. The 
agonistic striving for distinction can take place only within a community of equals. 
Consequently, the struggle to overcome social domination can be understood only as a 
pre-political act of liberation, following which a new political freedom might be 
inaugurated. And it is here, perhaps, above all that Arendt may have stood to learn 
something from Marx had she not been so quick with her wholesale dismissal.54 As neo-
Marxists (Negri, Badiou and Rancière amongst them) have variously argued, the 
productivity of political action, the constitution of new forms of commonality or 
subjectivity first emerge precisely in moments of political antagonism. Far from being a 
necessary precondition for politics, equality is more often than not the object of political 
dispute, in situations where equality (even visibility) must be claimed by actors from an 
opponent who denies it to them. By engaging in a struggle for recognition, parties to a 
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conflict demonstrate their equality; and in doing so, disclose new subject positions and 
another possible world. 
Citing John Adams in On Revolution, Arendt asserts that the fundamental 
deprivation suffered by the poor is that of appearance within a common world. She 
observes sympathetically that ‘Marx’s effort to rewrite history in terms of class struggle 
was partially at least inspired by the desire to rehabilitate posthumously those to whose 
injured lives history had added the insult of oblivion’.55 Rancière agrees that the political 
wrong suffered by the poor consists in their invisibility. However, he rejects Arendt’s 
suggestion that only someone such as Adams, who had experienced the joy of public life, 
could appreciate what it would mean to be deprived of the bios politikos. On the contrary, 
he points out that the politics of the poor have invariably concerned ‘precisely their mode 
of visibility’.56 If Arendt misses this, it is due to her stubborn insistence on the dichotomy 
between necessity and freedom. And where there are moments in Arendt’s work where 
her historical observations seem to bring her close to the realisation of how freedom can 
be enacted through an antagonistic politics aimed at abolishing inequality, these moments 
are quickly passed over through the reassertion of a political ontology that constitutively 
undercuts that realisation before it can surface.  
 
III. Depleting the Space of Appearances 
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 There is a less-discussed section in The Human Condition that bears out the 
contradictions in Arendt’s thought in a revealing way. It is where Arendt interrupts her 
phenomenological analysis to remark on ‘the extraordinarily productive role which the 
labour movements have played in modern politics’.57 This political productivity came 
about when those involved in the labour movement took it upon themselves to self-
organise, developing their own ideas and practices of self-government, exemplified in the 
brief flourishing of council democracy. She says: 
 
When the labour movement appeared on the political scene, it was the only organization 
in which men acted and spoke qua men – and not qua members of society. For this 
political and revolutionary role of the labour movement … it is decisive that the economic 
activity of its members was incidental and that its force of attraction was never restricted 
to the ranks of the working class. If for a time it almost looked as if the movement would 
succeed in founding, at least within its own ranks, a new public space with new political 
standards, the spring of these attempts was not labour – neither the labouring activity 
itself nor the always utopian rebellion against life’s necessities – but those injustices and 
hypocrisies which have disappeared with the transformation of a class society into a mass 
society and with the substitution of a guaranteed annual wage for daily or weekly pay.58 
 
The argument is riddled with circularity and contradiction. 
Arendt begins by conceding the ‘apparently flagrant discrepancy between 
historical fact – the political productivity of the working class – and the phenomenal data 
obtained from [her] analysis of the labouring activity’.59 ‘Apparently flagrant’ is an odd 
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formulation that captures something of her unease at the wedge she herself has driven 
between the history of constituent political power of the labour movement and her 
political ontology that denies them that their action is political, let alone constituent. To 
get herself out of this ‘apparently flagrant discrepancy’ she will claim that the labour 
movement was really only incidentally about labour. It was not the ‘necessities’ 
associated with a decent wage, decent working conditions, a degree of control over the 
productive process, the re-appropriation of the means of production, the scope of claims 
that one would assume make the labour movement a labour movement. Instead, for 
Arendt, it was about ‘founding a new public space’ where workers would act ‘qua men – 
and not qua members of society’, ‘at least’, she concedes enigmatically, ‘within its own 
ranks’. Are we to assume that the meaning of that confinement (its own ranks) is to some 
form of workplace democracy?   
Obviously Arendt has nothing so confining in mind, and in order to rescue the 
political from the social, she will go on to insist that the contradiction into which she is 
led by her political ontology is only apparent. For, she argues, the world-disclosing (and 
therefore ‘properly political’) aspect of the labour movement ‘stemmed from its fight 
against society as a whole’. But with this desperate gesture to cleanse the movement from 
its origin in and connectedness to the social, in order to restore it untainted as properly 
political, Arendt tips the balance the other way. A ‘fight against society as a whole’ 
imports antagonism, a fight not on a political plane but against those who have 
appropriated that plane:  against, thus, the bourgeois appropriation of the public sphere on 
the basis of the particular configuration of the public/private distinction.60 Arendt is right 
to sense in the labour movement a challenge to precisely that configuration, one that 
relegates the demands of those at work to the private sphere and thus submits her valued 
principles of association – as non-political – to capitalist accumulation. A reaction of this 
kind and magnitude can only be antagonistic, not productive, to the public sphere as 
given. But now Arendt is caught. On the one hand her insistence on ‘natality’ draws her 
to world-disclosure of a different kind, that breaks into the given with the promise of the 
new. On the other hand her political ontology and the entrenchment of the social/political 
distinction prevents her from acknowledging what is distinctive about what the labour 
movement discloses to politics, because that would be founding the political in the social. 
If antagonism was the condition of possibility for the dramatic appearance of the 
labour movement on the political scene, Arendt’s conception of constituent power is 
emaciated precisely because she wants to isolate it from the social struggle – with its 
stakes, its subject-positions and its opportunities of disclosure – that gives rise to its 
appearance in the first place. She deprives it of any possible political purchase by 
abstracting world-disclosure from the material social context within which political actors 
come into conflict. 
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There is something both profound and disquieting in all this. Arendt’s 
phenomenology is about what appears as political, with its attendant attributes and 
functions of disclosure. To distil this emergence of the political and identify the 
possibilities of action that pertain to it she will resist any form of ‘instrumentalization of 
action and [with it] the degradation of politics into a means for something else’, and she 
will cleanse it of its origin in social divides and hierarchies. To this, she will establish a 
principle of formal equality and plurality as proper to the political – proper in the 
fundamental sense of constitutive – where discrimination and sheer difference 
characterise the social. That is how the political is first enabled in the mapping out 
through the specific binarisms and the opportunities they sustain.  
Arendt has been celebrated for her uncompromising defence of the political and 
her eloquent analysis of all that it sustains and makes possible: new beginnings, 
solidarity, wordliness. And she has policed the boundaries of the political from all aspects 
of society’s life that would impinge on it with claims that are properly those of 
administering and dealing with necessity. As in ideology’s most pervasive move, the 
enabling move displaces alternatives that are simultaneously occluded and forgotten. 
Forgotten in the sense that their occlusion is what enables the appearance, furnishes the 
modality of appearance. If freedom cannot be tied dialectically to necessity it is because 
to retrieve necessity is to deny freedom, it is to fold or collapse the space for the 
appearance of freedom. There is no political space in Arendt in which the social question 
can find political expression, because political expression – the realm of the in-between, 
of freedom and the rest – is what necessity is not. The effacement is at the level of 
context, at the level of what opens up meaningfully to perception. 
If the phenomenological moment is what is most valuable in Arendt – the process, 
that is, of the appearance of the political with all its world-disclosing brilliance – it is an 
emergence that Arendt can only tentatively sustain and sustain at a huge cost. The cost 
has to do, as we saw, with the bracketing from the sphere of properly political action and 
debate of all that which for her would contaminate it with society’s concerns and the 
administration of life’s necessities. ‘Tentatively’ because the political must be maintained 
as agonistic rather than antagonistic at all costs, maintained that is through the 
distribution of speaking positions that guarantees a certain confluence along given 
coordinates. Against this confluence, antagonism would import a constitutive negativity. 
And import it, for Arendt, in a way that would undercut the political. In the forms that 
Arendt was perhaps most eager to excise, it aimed to resist the move itself that discloses 
politics and sustains the plane of appearance as reductive, because depleted of what could 
in fact alone be constitutive of it as ‘common’: the equal share in the processes of social 
labour and the fruits of social production. 
 
